Western University

Scholarship@Western
Department of Economics Research Reports

Economics Working Papers Archive

2004

2004-3 Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon
Sequestration Programs
Brian C. Murray
Bruce A. McCarl
Heng-Chi Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsresrpt
Part of the Economics Commons
Citation of this paper:
Murray, Brian C., Bruce A. McCarl, Heng-Chi Lee. "2004-3 Estimating Leakage from Forest Carbon Sequestration Programs."
Department of Economics Research Reports, 2004-3. London, ON: Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario
(2004).

ESTIMATING LEAKAGE FROM FOREST CARBON SEQUESTRATION PROGRAMS
Brian C. Murray
RTI International
3040 Cornwallis Road
P.O. Box 12194
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
bcm@rti.org
Phone: 919-541-6468
Fax: 919-541-6683
Bruce A. McCarl
Department of Agricultural Economics
Texas A&M University
2124 TAMU
College Station, TX, 77843-2124
mccarl@tamu.edu
Phone: 979-845-1706
Fax: 979-862-8679
Heng-Chi Lee
Lecturer
Department of Economics
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
hlee43@uwo.ca
Phone: 519-661-2111
Fax: 519-661-3666
March 2003

Brian C. Murray is Director, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics Program at RTI;
Bruce A. McCarl is Regents Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M
University; and Heng-Chi Lee is Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Western
Ontario. Please send all correspondence to Brian Murray. This work was funded in part by the
U.S. EPA, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Non-CO2 Gases and Sequestration Branch through
a prime contract with Stratus Consulting as well as an agreement with Texas A&M and the
Texas Agricultural Experiment Station. We appreciate helpful comments provided by Ben
DeAngelo, Ken Andrasko of EPA, and Uwe Schneider of the University of Hamburg.

1

Murray, McCarl, and Lee

ABSTRACT
Leakage from forest carbon sequestration—the amount of a program’s direct carbon
benefits undermined by carbon releases elsewhere—depends critically on demanders’ ability to
substitute non-reserved timber for timber targeted by the program. Analytic, econometric, and
sector-level optimization models are combined to estimate leakage from different forest carbon
sequestration activities. Empirical estimates for the U.S. show leakage ranges from minimal
(<10 percent) to enormous (>90 percent), depending on the activity and region. These results
suggest that leakage effects should not be ignored in accounting for the net level of greenhouse
gas offsets from land use change and forestry mitigation activities.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Standing forests are a tremendous reservoir of biologically sequestered carbon. Globally,
about half of all terrestrial carbon is stored in forest ecosystems (IPCC 2000, p. 4). In the U.S.
alone, the amount of carbon stored in forests is about 35 gigatons (Birdsey and Heath 1995).
Land use change (primarily deforestation) was responsible for about 20 percent of the CO2
released to the atmosphere worldwide from 1989 to 1998 (IPCC 2000, p. 5). Moreover, forests
provide a wide range of benefits to society, including food, fiber, shelter, watershed services,
biodiversity, recreation, and aesthetic qualities. Thus, policies to prevent forest clearing or
establish new forests have the potential to produce a wide range of climate mitigation and other
social, economic, and environmental benefits. Because of the direct potential for reducing
atmospheric CO2 and the ancillary benefits referenced above, forest carbon sequestration has
been widely acclaimed as an option for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE). Land use
change and forestry (LUCF) are seen as mitigation options with potentially low opportunity costs
and high ancillary benefits (see IPCC 2000; Bush 2002).
As policy proposals to mitigate climate change have evolved from the 1992 United
Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janiero, it has become clear that, at least in the short run,
restrictions on the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) would be confined to a subset of the
world’s economies. The culmination of these actions is the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which is
directly applicable to only 38 of the world’s countries, although these 38 counties constituted a
majority of the world’s GHGE in 1990. In addition, countries such as the U.S., which have
elected not to participate in the KP currently, are contemplating unilateral emission reduction
efforts that would not be coordinated with actions in the rest of the world. The partial coverage
implied by the KP or the unilateral actions opens up the possibility that reductions in the
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countries reducing emissions would be offset, at least in part, by an induced increase in
economic activity in countries not pursuing such actions. This is the concept of leakage as has
been defined and discussed in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Third
Assessment Report (IPCC 2001).1 Because the climatological effects of GHGE are essentially
the same regardless of whether the emission comes from a constrained or unconstrained country,
leakage directly undermines GHGE-reducing actions and should be considered when designing
and evaluating policies.
A few developments warrant further examination of the leakage issue in climate policy.
First, in early 2001, the U.S. decided not to participate in the binding agreements of the KP,
thereby significantly expanding the share of world emissions generated by non-constrained
countries and enhancing the potential for leakage from a KP-based global emissions control
system. Second, increased attention has been paid both abroad (via the KP’s Clean Development
Mechanism, or CDM) and in the U.S. to “project-based” approaches to GHG mitigation.
Mitigation “projects” are specific transactions between two parties. One party (the buyer) wants
to emit some quantity of GHGs and chooses to “offset” part or all of these emissions by paying
another party (the seller) to either cut their emissions or, in the case evaluated here, remove
GHGs from the atmosphere via carbon sequestration.2 The amount of credit the buyer receives
for providing the offset should, in principle, net out any leakage caused outside the spatial and
temporal boundaries of the project. One characteristic of these project transactions is that they
are, by definition, location- and sector-specific. Therefore, leakage effects can spill out both
within the sector directly affected by the project and across sectors. Collectively, the existence
of leakage implies that programs need to be evaluated under a broad national and international
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accounting scheme so that leakage is estimated and the program achieves cost-effective global
GHGE reductions.
The specific focus of this paper is on developing an estimation procedure that addresses
the magnitude of potential leakage from carbon sequestration projects in the forest sector,
including the conversion of land from agriculture to forest (afforestation). Leakage is prominent
among the concerns often raised about forest carbon sequestration projects as a GHG mitigation
strategy by environmental advocacy groups (e.g., Greenpeace 2000; Climate Action Network
1999), and there is wide recognition that leakage should be deducted from the carbon credits
granted to a mitigation project (IPCC 2000). President Bush’s 2002 Global Climate Change
Initiative specifically directs the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Energy to develop accounting rules and guidelines for
crediting carbon sequestration projects. Yet there is very little empirical evidence on the
magnitude of leakage and therefore very little basis on which to calculate the size of the leakage
deduction for a representative forest carbon sequestration project. Our objective in this paper is
to provide an estimation framework based on economic principles and some empirical evidence
on the likely extent of leakage from these types of activities. Specifically, we seek to explain the
following:
•

interaction of market forces that cause leakage from forest-sector projects,

•

key parameters that determine the magnitude of leakage, and

•

approximate extent of leakage under different empirical conditions.
II.

RELATED LITERATURE

Although this paper focuses on leakage potential from forestry projects, it is helpful to
first view the leakage problem more broadly and to establish the connection between this paper
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and the leakage-related literature. Stavins (1997) identifies two primary channels for leakage to
occur under climate mitigation policies adopted by a subset of the world’s nations:
1. Constraints on cooperating countries shift comparative advantage in carbon-intensive
goods toward non-cooperating countries, leading to a relative rise in production (and
emissions) outside the cooperating coalition of parties.
2. A unilateral policy on behalf of a coalition of countries constraining emissions may
lower world demand for carbon-intensive fuels, thereby reducing the world price for
such fuels. As a result, demands for such fuels (and emissions) can rise outside the
coalition.
How important are these effects? Several papers have examined the potential empirical
magnitude of leakage when GHG abatement actions in the energy sector (e.g., emissions limits,
carbon taxes, or tradable permits) are applicable to only a subset of the world’s countries (e.g.,
Oliveira-Martins et al. 1992; Felder and Rutherford 1993; Manne and Rutherford 1994; Jacoby et
al. 1997; Smith 1998; Bernstein et al. 1999; Barker 1999; Babiker 2001). These leakage
estimates range from negligible (Barker 1999) to substantial (Felder and Rutherford 1993) but
typically are in the range of 5 to 20 percent of targeted country emission reductions (IPCC 2001).
In the case of agriculture, modeling shows that unilateral implementation of the KP in the U.S.
could lead to a decline in U.S. exports and an increase in production in the rest of the world,
which is indicative of leakage (Lee et al. 2000; Lee 2002).
Perhaps some of the most empirically relevant studies for addressing leakage potential
from LUCF can be found in the economics literature on investment crowding or “slippage” from
forest and agricultural conservation programs. Lee et al. (1992) examine U.S. tree-planting
programs to determine whether government-subsidized tree-planting crowds out private tree-
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planting investment. If so, this would be indicative of leakage. Their econometric results do not
strongly support a crowding-out effect. Policies such as the USDA Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) are targeted to retire land from agriculture production for soil conservation and
other environmental objectives. Slippage occurs when practices on non-targeted lands generate
the environmental impacts targeted by the policies. Wu (2000) finds in the case of the CRP that
about 20 percent of the acres diverted from production were replaced by other acreage, with 9 to
14 percent of the environmental benefits offset. Wu et al. (2001) show that such problems make
cost-benefit analysis of individual projects misleading, and they argue for more comprehensive
treatment. As further evidence of offsetting responses by farmers to targeted program offerings,
leakage is also found to occur with participation in U.S. crop commodity programs (Brooks et al.
1992; Hoag et al. 1993). Wear and Murray (2003) indirectly address the leakage issue by
estimating the magnitude of extra-regional feedback from region-specific forest preservation
policies. The feedback effects are large, although denominated in softwood lumber units not in
carbon. That study is featured in more detail below.
The literature on leakage from region-specific sequestration strategies in the forest sector
is not as well developed as the multi-region and multi-sector studies referenced above. A study
by Alig et al. (1997) uses a model of the U.S. forest and agricultural sectors to evaluate the net
effects of certain forest carbon sequestration strategies such as afforestation. Although that study
does not specifically estimate the size of leakage, it does find that the GHG benefits of a
particular type of afforestation program are largely offset by a corresponding conversion of other
forestland to agriculture. This implies large leakage potential from afforestation; however, the
paper evaluates a fairly coarse policy design (forcing land from agriculture to forests) that does
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not provide for counter-incentives to keep existing land in forests. Therefore, it may overstate
leakage effects from a more incentive-compatible policy.
Recent papers have addressed the issue of leakage in forestry and land use climate
mitigation projects by either inferring the magnitude of leakage potential analytically (Chomitz
2002), synthesizing the results of studies addressing phenomena similar to leakage (Schwarze et
al. 2002), or qualitatively assessing leakage potential and assigning ad hoc values for the leakage
deduction (Aukland et al. 2003; Geres and Michaelowa 2002). Chomitz (2002) compares the
potential from leakage from forestry projects to that from energy-sector projects to argue that the
former are not systematically more prone to leakage than the latter (as some parties have argued
they are). Defining leakage in terms related to economic theory and expressing leakage as a
mathematical expression of key economic and biophysical variables—an approach followed by
Chomitz and a path we follow here as well—are important first steps. However, we go beyond
that point here by employing data and models to estimate directly the magnitude of leakage for a
range of specific forest carbon sequestration activities across different regions in the U.S. By
quantifying leakage effects for these activities and regions, we can take a step forward in
assessing project credits for projects with similar characteristics.
III.

A MODEL FOR MEASURING LEAKAGE FROM A FOREST PRESERVATION
PROJECT
To further explain leakage concepts, we first use an analytic model that focuses on a

single, but important, form of forest carbon sequestration policy: forest preservation. Further
into the paper, we will estimate leakage from a broader set of activities.
For the purposes of this analysis, we consider the gross and net carbon sequestration
effects of forest preservation, which prohibits harvest on targeted lands establishing nature
reserves, wilderness area, parks, or other forms of protected lands. As a consequence, the
8
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standing forest carbon and the soil carbon as well as all future growth in those items will remain
stored for an extended period of time. In the case of forest preservation, leakage would occur to
the extent that the carbon saved in the reserved forests is offset by increased harvest and
accompanying carbon losses on other forest lands outside of the reserved area. This diversion of
carbon losses is caused by the response of market suppliers not directly affected by the harvest
restriction.
III.1

Reserved and Non-reserved Timber as Perfect Substitutes
We first examine the case where the timber produced in the reserved area and timber

produced in the unreserved areas are perfect demand substitutes. Suppose in that case we have
two sources of supply in a timber market, represented by the following supply functions:
QS = QS (P, WR, IR)

[1]

QS = QS (P, WN, IN)

[2]

R

N

R

N

where QS (k = R, N) is the quantity of harvested wood products that could be supplied to the
k

market from source k, P is the wood product price, Wk is a price vector of inputs used in
harvesting at source k, and Ik is the fixed inventory of harvestable forest capital stock on those
lands. The k subscript represents the supply source where R identifies supply from sources
potentially targeted by a forest preservation program, and N identifies supply from outside the
potentially reserved lands. Although we omit a time subscript, the supply function is conditional
on the harvestable inventory (Ik) and price signals applicable at a given point in time.3
Under the assumption that the timber produced by suppliers R and N is perfect substitutes
in demand, the aggregate demand function for timber is given by
QD = QD(P, Z),

[3]
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where Z is a vector of demand shifters (e.g., income, price of substitute goods). Because the
products are perfect substitutes and we assume the locations are in close proximity, suppliers R
and N receive the same market price. Market equilibrium occurs when a price is determined
(P*) that equates supply and demand:
QS (P*, WN, IN) + QS (P*, WR, IR) = QD (P*, Z).
N

R

[4]

For this analysis, it is helpful to think of the demand facing supply segment N as a
residual demand function, that is, the difference between total market demand and the amount
supplied by segment N:
QD (P, Z, WR, IR) = QD (P, Z) – QS (P,WR, IR)
N

[5]

R

Inserting [5] into the equilibrium condition [4], produces an equilibrium for segment N of
QS (P*, WN, IN) = QD (P*, Z, WR, IR).
N

[6]

N

This market setup is illustrated in Figure 1. Panel (a) depicts the total demand function,
Panel (b) shows the supply function for segment R, and Panel (c) demonstrates the
corresponding equilibrium for segment N. Initially, N’s residual demand function, DN, reflects
the difference between the total demand function D in (a) and the supply function SR in (b). The
equilibrium market price is P0, the amount produced by supply segment N is QN0, the amount
produced by supply segment R is QR0, and the total amount produced and consumed is <Q0 =
QN0 + QR0.
Suppose a policy goes into effect that compensates landowners to forego timber harvests
on all of the forests comprising supply segment R. In essence, supply segment R leaves the
market, QR = QR (P*,WR, IR) = 0, and all demand must be met by segment N. This is depicted
in Figure 1 by an outward shift in N’s demand function from the initial residual demand function
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DN to the total market demand function DN´ = D. At the baseline price of P0, the magnitude of
the outward shift is exactly equal to the amount that would be produced by supply segment R if
the preservation policy were not in effect [QR0 = QS (P0,WR, IR)]. The demand shift reflects the
R

fact that the policy causes all of R’s demand to gravitate directly to N.
When the outward shift in N’s demand function occurs, this disrupts the initial
price/quantity equilibrium (P0, QN0, QR0) and creates excess demand relative to supply. For the
market to clear again, the price will rise to induce more supply into the market from additional
harvest on the non-reserved lands and will simultaneously reduce the quantity demanded. This
will continue until the new market equilibrium is reached at (P1, QN1). The market-clearing
process causes N’s harvest quantity to expand from the initial value of QN0 to the new
equilibrium quantity of QN1. The release of sequestered forest carbon caused by this priceinduced supply response is the leakage effect. The net society-wide GHG effect is the additional
carbon that is sequestered on the reserved forest (R) less the carbon releases from the harvests
induced on the non-reserved forests, N.
The magnitude of N’s demand shift can be measured by a parameter equal to the ratio of
the baseline supply quantity from the reserved forest to the baseline supply quantity from the
non-reserved forest. Let’s call this the “preservation” parameter, N = QR0/QN0. In Figure 1, this
is the proportional increase in demand quantity from QN0 to Q0, the horizontal distance of the
outward shift of the demand function. Comparative statics can be performed on the market
equilibrium system defined by equations [1] through [6] to derive a mathematical expression for
the leakage effect as a function of the exogenous parameters (see Murray et al. 2002, Appendix
A, for the derivation). That expression is
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100 * e * CN
,
[7]
[e – E*(1 + N)] CR
where e is the supply price elasticity, which is assumed the same for both forest groups, E is the

L=

price elasticity of demand, CN is the carbon sequestration reduction per unit of harvest from the
non-reserved forest, and CR is the carbon sequestration per unit of (foregone) harvest gained by
preserving the reserved forest. L provides an estimate of the leakage effect in percentage terms
and equals the amount of carbon released through diverted harvests divided by the amount of
carbon saved on the preserved forest times 100.
Consider a case in which supply and demand elasticities are unitary elastic (e = 1 E = –1),
the magnitude of the timber restriction is non-trivial (N = 0.10), and the carbon density of
restricted (CR) and non-restricted forests (CN) is identical. With these parameter values, the
leakage estimate is 47 percent, indicating that about half of the carbon retained on the reserved
forests is offset by carbon released through displaced harvests. Differentiation of equation [7]
reveals that leakage is enhanced the more responsive suppliers are to price (dL/de > 0), the less
responsive demanders are to price (dL/d|E| < 0), and the higher the ratio between carbon density
on non-restricted forests to restricted forests (dL/d[CN/CR] >0). Moreover, leakage is
proportionately larger when the relative size of the restriction falls (dL/dN <0). This runs
counter to the notion that leakage is less of a problem for small isolated projects than it is for
larger (e.g., national-scale) programs and can thus simply be ignored. In absolute terms, of
course, leakage will be smaller when the policy itself is limited. However, the relevant issue
here is how large leakage is in proportion to carbon enhancement on the forest targeted by the
policy. The result, dL/dN < 0, implies that smaller interventions have larger proportional leakage
effects. Thus, ignoring leakage at the project level is not a prudent option. We will return to this
below.
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III.2

Leakage When Timber Products are Imperfect Substitutes
Timber from reserved areas will not always be easily replaced. Forest preservation is

often targeted in areas that have unique ecological characteristics, thereby enhancing the
preservation benefits. Consequently, the preserved forest may contain unique species or qualities
of timber that do not have close substitutes outside the preserved site. This may limit the degree
to which demanders seek harvests elsewhere and thereby limit leakage from the policy. That
suggests the homogeneous commodity assumption above could introduce upward leakage
estimate biases because it tends to maximize the extent to which the market would simply
relocate the harvests. We therefore relax the perfect substitution assumption here to include the
case of differentiated products.
The leakage effects of imperfect substitution can be illustrated by reference back to
Figure 1, specifically the supply and residual demand functions for segment N. Let N’s residual
demand function (DN) shift caused by the preservation policy be expressed
SRDN = (QR0,

[8]

where SRDN is the magnitude (the horizontal distance) of the outward shift in DN caused by the
removal of R’s supply from the market, holding all other demand factors constant. The
substitution parameter, (, captures the extent to which the residual demand for product N shifts
out in response to eliminating product R. When ( = 1, there is a 1:1 relationship between the
amount of product R withdrawn from the market and the increase in the demand for product N.
In other words, R and N are perfect substitutes. When ( = 0, the products are in completely
separate markets, and there is no substitution at all between them and no shift in N’s demand
function.4
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Figure 1 (perfect substitutability between R and N timber) reflects the case of ( = 1. If
( = 0.5, the products are moderate substitutes, and DN would only shift out half as far as in the
perfect substitutes case of Figure 1. Consequently, the harvest response from the N sector to R’s
withdrawal of harvests from the market—and the corresponding leakage—is muted. Equation
[5] can be modified to capture these substitution effects (see Murray et al. 2002, Appendix A):
100 * e * γ * C N
[9]
[e − E * (1 + γ * φ)] C R
Differentiation of [9] shows that the leakage is enhanced by the degree of substitutability (dL'/d(

L´ =

> 0).
III.3

Will Reserves in Small Countries Avoid Leakage?
It has been argued that leakage is likely minimal if establishing a reserve in a small

country that exports a homogeneous timber commodity into the large world market (see, for
example, Chomitz [2002]). However we offer a different view. Being small players on the
world market, these countries do face a highly elastic demand curve for timber. In the extreme,
they are pure price takers facing an infinitely elastic demand. As shown above, more elastic
demand diminishes leakage (dL/d|E|<0), thereby suggesting, at first glance, that a forest
preservation project in a small country facing a large global market would have little or no
leakage. We believe the no-leakage implication is correct, but only within the country. No
leakage occurs within a country because the export price determines the amount of timber
supplied by that country and that price will not be affected by the preservation project and thus
will not affect harvest incentives anywhere else within the country.
However, we believe the correct way to view the small country situation implies leakage
could occur on a large scale. The world market for timber tends toward fairly inelastic aggregate
demand (Sohngen et al. 1999), but the small country’s share of the world market is very small,
14

Murray, McCarl, and Lee
thereby leaving that country with a highly elastic residual demand on the world market. Leakage
does occur in this situation, but the harvests shift to outside the country instead of within. To see
this, consider the components of a country’s export demand function. The export demand faced
by country S after considering supply and demand actions in the rest of the world (QDX) can be
S

expressed as a function of total world demand (QD) and the amount supplied by the rest of the
W

world (Q S ), both of which are a function of the world (export) price (P):5
ROW

QDX = QD (P) – Q S (P).
S

W

[10]

ROW

It can readily be shown (see Murray et al. 2002, Appendix B) that the demand elasticity facing
small country S (EX) is a function of the world demand elasticity (EW), the supply elasticity from
S

the rest of the world (erow), the share of country i’s exports in total world consumption (HX), and
S

the ratio of country i’s exports to total rest-of-world production (HW):
S

EX = EW (1/ HX) – erow(1 / HW).
S

S

[11]

S

This shows that country S’s export demand elasticity is inversely proportional to its share of the
world market. When this share is very small, the demand elasticity the country faces is very
large, all else equal. For instance, under a world demand elasticity of –1.0, a world supply
elasticity of +1.0, and country s’s export share of the world market of about 1 percent, the
relevant export demand elasticity is –200, which for all practical purposes is perfectly elastic.
Again, using this value in the leakage equation would yield a very low estimate of leakage within
small country S. But the reason that the export demand elasticity is so elastic is that there is an
ample amount of supply elsewhere in the world to offset any reduction in country S’s exports
without a noticeable effect on world price. In other words, an elastic demand facing country S
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suggests there are ample extramural leakage opportunities when country S reduces production in
the name of sequestration.
To evaluate the magnitude of leakage in such cases, one would either need an integrated
model of global forest products trade and carbon accounting or to treat the supply and demand
equations in our leakage calculation as if they are global timber supply and demand equations.
The former is outside the scope of this paper, but we could proxy for these global effects by
treating the isolated forest preservation project as if it caused a very small increase in the residual
demand function for unreserved forests (i.e., as if the size of the market shock caused by the
preservation action is very small relative to the world market). But, as shown above, smaller
shocks have larger proportional leakage effects, all else equal (dL/dN <0), thereby supporting the
view that relatively small projects in small countries do not systematically have smaller
proportional net leakage effects.
The point just made about small countries and leakage is relevant only to the issue of
scale effects. In other words, leakage is not proportionally smaller just because projects are
small. However, if the timber produced by a small country is sufficiently unique, the lack of
substitutability with the non-reserved timber, ((<1) as referenced above, may apply. If a small
timber-exporting country such as Costa Rica or Bolivia produces highly specialized timber, its
withdrawal from the market may not be entirely offset by an increase in demand elsewhere.
However, any corresponding effects in mitigating leakage are due to the product differentiation
factor ((), not to the scale factor (N).
But one must be careful not to confuse the limited substitutability of a species with the
limited substitutability of a species from a particular site. For example, mahogany is a unique
and highly valued tropical hardwood that may be considered to have few close substitutes.
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However, mahogany, as rare as it may be, is not confined to just a few sites. So, for instance, if
mahogany harvests are curtailed at a particular site in Bolivia, demanders may still seek
mahogany at unrestricted sites in Bolivia, Brazil, and elsewhere in the tropics. In fact, the notion
that mahogany as a species has relatively few close substitutes tends to make the aggregate
demand for mahogany less elastic to price (see Merry and Carter [2001] for econometric
estimates of Bolivian export mahogany demand). As shown above, more inelastic demand
increases the extent to which demanders continue to seek harvests elsewhere even at higher
prices, thereby enhancing leakage. Thus, it is not entirely clear that timber heterogeneity will
necessarily lessen leakage.
III.4

Do the Leakage Examples Above Hold Up Empirically? An Examination of Forest
Preservation in the U.S. Pacific Northwest
To empirically test the implications drawn from the above model, consider an actual

preservation case. In particular, consider the effects of U.S. federal restrictions on the sale and
harvest of old growth timber from national forests that were implemented in the 1990s. During a
10-year time period, the volume of Pacific Northwest (PNW) timber harvested from public lands
was reduced by about 85 percent and has remained low since then. Such a reduction, which was
a result largely of endangered species and other ecological concerns, could also have been done
in the name of forest preservation and carbon sequestration. Wear and Murray (2003) examined
the timber restrictions to see the extent to which they induced harvests in other timber supply
regions within North America (i.e., leakage). Wear and Murray estimated an econometric model
of the U.S. softwood lumber market, which aggregated sources of supply into that from the
PNW, the U.S. South, and Canada. In turn, they used the model to simulate the effect of the
reduction in timber sales from federal forests in the PNW. Simulated variables included the U.S.
lumber price and the distribution of output and timber harvests across North American regions.
17
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Table 1 summarizes Wear and Murray’s results, which can be viewed as a crude indicator
of leakage using timber production, rather than carbon, as the displaced commodity (Wear and
Murray did not directly address carbon matters). The average annual federal timber harvest
reduction in the U.S. West for the period 1990 to 1995 was approximately 2.1 billion board feet.
However, Wear and Murray estimate that private harvests in the West rose by 895 million board
feet in response. Thus, just within the region, the leakage factor results indicate about 43 percent
of the reduction leaked away and was replaced by other regionally induced harvests. The
leakage effect increases when we expand the effects in the U.S. South and Canada. Wear and
Murray estimate an additional 300 million board foot harvest response, raising the continental
U.S. leakage estimate to 58 percent. Finally, Wear and Murray estimate a 550 million board foot
response in Canada, resulting in a North American continental scale leakage estimate of 84
percent. If we compute the forecasted leakage using the formula above (equation 7) with
parameters derived from the Wear and Murray model (e = +0.46 – a weighted average of all four
supply regions, E = –0.06, N = 0.045) we get a predicted leakage level of 87 percent, indicating
close correspondence between leakage model predictions and actual observations.
IV.

BROADER EXAMINATION OF LEAKAGE—A MULTI-SECTOR,
INTERTEMPORAL SIMULATION

Up to this point, the emphasis of the forest preservation leakage story has been on
feedback from the timber market. But people clear forests for a wide range of purposes, some of
which have little to do with timber returns. A prominent incentive for clearing land, especially in
developing countries, is agricultural expansion. If a forest is reserved that would otherwise be
converted for agriculture, the operative issue for evaluating leakage is which markets are
affected. The demand for land from shifting cultivators will presumably still exist. Thus, at least
some of the deforestation seems likely to shift from protected to unprotected lands, unless
18
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specific measures are taken to reduce the land intensity of agricultural practices. Consequently,
leakage potential under these circumstances would seemingly be high. Thus, one must look at
feedback from the land market to get a better handle on leakage. We expand the analysis here to
look at land market interactions in the context of well-developed land markets in the U.S. But
we recognize that the assessment is more complex in settings where land market institutions are
not as well developed.
Induced afforestation, another prominent carbon sequestration policy option, may cause
changes in commodity and land markets that cause countervailing reductions in management
intensity on existing forests or land use change from forest to other uses such as agriculture.
Leakage may also occur intertemporally with current programs causing a time stream of nearterm carbon sequestration followed by later releases. We were unable to investigate such
intertemporal phenomena with an analytically tractable theoretical model and thus turned to an
empirically based simulation model. In particular, we used the FASOM forest and agricultural
sector model (Adams et al. 1996, 1999) to investigate empirical leakage consequences.
FASOM is an intertemporal, price-endogenous, spatial equilibrium model simulating
temporal activities in and land transfers between the agricultural and forestry sectors. FASOM
uses mathematical programming methods to maximize the present value of aggregate
consumers’ and producers’ surplus in both sectors, subject to resource constraints. The results
from FASOM simulate prices, productions, management, and consumption. In FASOM, the
U.S. is divided into 11 regions and includes 48 primary and 45 secondary commodities and three
forest products. The timber growth depends on land class, owner type, species, site class, and
management intensities, while the agricultural sector activities are based on the agricultural
sector model (Chang et al. 1992).
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The GHG accounting in FASOM accounts for terrestrial carbon in forest ecosystems on
existing forest stands, regenerated and afforested stands, non-commercial carbon pools after
harvest, harvested timber products, and agricultural lands (Lee 2002, Schneider 2000, McCarl
and Schneider 2001). The modified version of FASOM was solved repeatedly by adding
additional policy constraints in each case listed below.
1. Forest setasides: Establishment of a forest reserve that removes specific acreage
from the private harvest base. The scenario targets acres that would otherwise be
harvested in the model’s base scenario. We examine separately the PNW and U.S.
South.
2. Avoided deforestation: Forestland that was projected to be converted to agriculture
under baseline conditions is kept in forest forever and treated one of two ways:
preserved without harvest or allowed to continue on a perpetual harvest-reforestation
cycle. Simulations are run separately for each region.
3. Afforestation: A 10-million acre afforestation program applied in separate scenarios
to different regions.
4. Afforestation/avoided deforestation: A dual national policy of payment incentives
(credits) for carbon sequestered on afforested acres and charges for carbon lost on
deforested acres. This scenario is motivated by the afforestation/reforestation/
deforestation (ARD) provisions of Article 3.3 of the KP.
FASOM generates a stream of outputs from the forest and agricultural sector for each
decade from 2000 to 2070. Simulated variables include carbon stocks and flows, timber harvest
volumes, forest management intensity, harvest rotation lengths, international trade volume,
program costs, and social welfare measures (producer and consumer surplus). Given the
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emphasis on leakage estimation here, we focus our discussion on carbon quantity effects. We
modify the leakage measures from the analytical model above to account for the intertemporal
dimension of carbon flows:
LT = [(PVP – PVT)/PVP]*100.

[12]

PVP is the time-discounted present value of carbon sequestration increment on lands targeted by
the policy. PVT is the corresponding discounted value of carbon increments on all lands
(targeted and non-targeted). The present value measures are calculated in standard fashion:
T
cjt
PVj = ∑
.
(1 + r)t

[13]

t=1

The cjt variable represents carbon increment on land area j (P or T) at time t. We use a discount
rate (r) of 4 percent in these simulations. The results for each case are presented below.
IV.1

Forest Setaside Program Results
We consider forest preservation projects in two regions of the U.S.: old-growth forests of

the west side of the PNW (PNWW) and harvestable mature forests in the South-central (SC)
region. The simulation is executed by identifying approximately 100,000 acres of old growth
that would have been harvested in the PNWW under FASOM’s baseline run and by permanently
setting aside these lands from harvesting in a FASOM policy run. Likewise, we set aside
roughly 660,000 acres in the SC region fitting these characteristics.
The two regional scenarios are run independently and generate leakage estimates (LT) of
16.2 percent for the PNWW and 68.3 percent for the SC. The difference in these two values can
be explained in part by the relative carbon densities of forests in the PNWW and SC. Setting
aside old-growth forest in the PNWW diverts harvests to other regions, such as the SC, where the
forests are typically younger and more uniform; hence, the carbon losses from harvest will not be
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as large as the carbon savings in the PNWW. Conversely, protecting a relatively less carbondense forest in the South diverts harvests to the more carbon-rich PNWW, potentially causing
large leakage effects.
IV.2

Avoided Deforestation Results
The avoided deforestation scenario differs from the setaside scenario just analyzed. This

policy is targeted specifically on lands that would otherwise convert to agriculture in the
baseline, whereas the setaside policy simply removes from the potential harvest base mature
forests that would otherwise be slated for a perpetual harvest-reforest regime. The results are
presented in Table 2 for candidate projects in several regions and for the two variations of
allowed activity on the targeted land.
The lowest leakage is found in the PNW east side (PNWE), again suggesting that actions
to protect these forests may divert harvesting and deforestation to regions where the carbon
losses are not as severe. Lake States leakage is quite high, over 90 percent under the no-harvest
scenario. This suggests that protecting specific forest tracts from agricultural conversion in this
region might simply divert forest clearing to other areas within and outside the region and
thereby do little to generate net carbon gains.
Allowing harvests on the land that is saved from deforestation reduces leakage, all else
equal. In particular when harvesting is allowed on these lands, we do not find that harvests are
shifted as much outside the reserved area. However, allowing harvest also means that less
carbon is sequestered on the targeted lands.
The FASOM result shows negative leakage in the Corn Belt/harvesting allowed example.
Activities on targeted lands in that region generate positive carbon spillovers on non-targeted
lands. This might occur, for instance, if forest preservation pushes up timber prices enough to
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induce management investments elsewhere that more than make up for displaced harvests.
However, the amount of negative leakage is quite small (–4.4 percent) and thus perhaps not too
much should be inferred about the presence of positive spillover effects from this single estimate.
IV.3

Afforestation Program Results
Table 3 presents the results of a fairly large (10 million acre) afforestation program

converting land from agriculture to forests applied in different regions. We run these scenarios
separately (e.g., only one program is in effect for each run of FASOM) for selected regions
(those that have had some history of large-scale movement of land between agriculture and
forestry). Leakage estimates range from just under 20 percent in the Lake States to just over 40
percent in the two southern regions. It is not surprising to find larger leakage effects in the
South, because that is the region of the U.S. where afforestation, reforestation, and forest
management are the most intense. Thus, we should expect that targeted afforestation projects
there are more likely to displace activity that would otherwise occur on non-targeted lands.
IV.4

Afforestation-Avoided Deforestation Results
We simulate a national policy that pays carbon credits for land that moves from

agriculture to forests and charges carbon debits for land that is deforested, much like one that
might have sprung from implementation of Article 3.3 of the KP in the U.S. Land that does not
change use is unaffected by the policy. It is the corresponding management responses on those
lands, and the carbon consequences thereof, that constitute leakage. For instance, more land in
forests could depress timber prices, thereby reducing the incentive for forest management—and,
jointly, carbon management—on non-targeted lands.
Figure 2 presents the leakage estimates for this scenario under a wide range of carbon
prices ($5 to 500 per tonne, carbon equivalent). First note the magnitude. Leakage estimates
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range from 7 to 17 percent. These estimates are lower than those found with the pure
afforestation scenario above. The primary reason for this is that deforestation is penalized in this
scenario and thereby discourages some of the offsetting land movements that might occur in a
program that focuses entirely on the one-way movement of land from agriculture to forest.
Second, note the pattern of the relationship between the carbon price and the leakage effect. At
higher carbon prices, the leakage effect declines.6 Because the scale of the targeted program is
larger at higher prices (i.e., there is greater participation when the incentives are higher), this
provides some further evidence that leakage effects are proportionately higher the smaller the
program (or project).
V.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper uses economic principles, data, and methods to frame the leakage issue in the
context of forest-sector climate mitigation projects (including afforestation of agricultural lands).
We find that, under some circumstances, leakage from geographically targeted mitigation
projects can be sizeable and in other cases it is not. It is commonly argued that small projects
will have negligible effects on the affected markets and therefore generate little leakage. Our
results suggest otherwise. For small projects, leakage may be small in absolute terms, but it
tends to be larger in proportion to the direct project benefits than a larger program or policy.
Thus, leakage outside the boundaries of even small projects should not be ignored.
The empirical results presented here are primarily applicable to the U.S., where land,
agricultural, and timber markets are well developed. Results could certainly differ elsewhere.
Well-functioning markets tend to expand the geographic boundary of market exchanges and
thereby expand the area in which leakage may occur. Thus, in that sense, our estimates may be
seen as upper-end values. However, it should be noted that the economic model used to generate
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most of our estimates operates at the national level and focuses on two sectors of the economy.
Because international and inter-sectoral leakages are also possible, the absence of those effects in
our model may lead to an understatement of leakage. Clearly better integration of sector-level
models with broader computable general equilibrium models operating on an international scale
is needed.
Although the emphasis here has been on estimating the size of leakage effects from
mitigation projects in forestry, leakage effects are not just endemic to this sector. Similar
adjustments should also be made in accounting for projects in the energy-sector and other parts
of the economy using empirically based estimates generated by economic models. Throughout
the nascent literature on leakage referenced above, researchers have wondered whether leakage
in forest carbon projects is systematically larger or smaller than energy-sector leakage. The
empirical results here suggest that forest carbon leakage may be somewhat larger than the energy
sector estimates (previously cited as roughly 5 to 20 percent), although part of this gap could be
due to differences in the methods used across studies. If indeed leakage is more pronounced in
forest carbon projects than energy-sector projects, this could affect the terms of trade for the
credits generated by different sources and thereby affect the optimal portfolio of mitigation
options. A clear implication of this is that policy designers and market makers should adequately
account for leakage effects when enabling exchanges of GHG offsets.
VI.
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1

The phenomenon described here has been referred to by other names, including “slippage,”
“rebound effect,” and more generally “crowding.” But “leakage” is the prevalent term
for this effect in climate policy.

2

The choice to purchase offsets for one’s GHG emissions can either be mandatory, as in the case
of an emissions cap and trade system, or a voluntary action perhaps either in anticipation
of future GHG restrictions or in the interest of corporate goodwill.

3

The inclusion of a quasi-fixed capital stock variable on the right-hand side classifies these as
short-run timber supply functions as defined by Wear and Parks (1994).

4(

could, in principle, take on a negative value, implying the products are complements rather
than substitutes, but that possibility is not central to the leakage story and is not addressed
further in this paper.

5

Transportation costs are ignored here without loss of generality.

6

Note that this is a percentage decline in the leakage effect (leaked carbon relative to targeted
carbon), not an absolute decline in leaked carbon.
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Table 1. Estimated Harvest Leakage Effects from Federal Timber Restrictions in the U.S.
Pacific Northwest (from Wear and Murray [2003])
Public Harvest Timber Reductions

Million Board Feeta

West Coast

1,200.4

Inland West

866.8

Total West

2,067.2
Percent Leakageb

Induced Harvests Elsewhere
Western private lands

894.6

South

298.9

U.S. total
Canada

1,744.0

quantities are in million board feet, timber scale (1990–1995 annual average).

bLeakage

57.7%

550.4

North America total
aAll

1,193.5

43.3%

= Induced harvest in area i divided by total West public harvest reduction.
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Table 2. Avoided Deforestation Leakage Results (All Quantities Are Percentages)
Region
Pacific Northwest—east side

No Harvesting Allowed

Harvesting Allowed

8.9

7.9

Northeast

43.1

41.4

Lake states

92.2

73.4

Corn Belt

31.5

–4.4

South-Central

28.8

21.3
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Table 3. Afforestation Program Leakage Estimates by Region (All Quantities Are
Percentages)
Region

Leakage Estimate (%)

Northeast

23.2

Lake states

18.3

Corn Belt

30.2

Southeast

40.6

South-Central

42.5
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Figure 1. How Creating a Forest Reserve Can Shift Timber Harvests to Non-reserved
Forests

Figure 2. Leakage Effects as a Function of the Carbon Price; Afforestation-Avoided
Deforestation Scenario
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